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Abstract
This paper examines the two currency disturbances that took place in Croatia,
at the beginning of 1999 and in the summer of 2001. The signals approach is used
in constructing a system of early warning indicators heralding currency disturbances.
It monitors the behaviour of various macroeconomic variables preceding a
disturbance or crisis. The paper also proposes composite leading indicators. The
performance of the indicators reveals that the two disturbances were different: the
1999 one came at the end of a banking crisis, while the 2001 disturbance was brought
about by a combination of the domestic financial and capital account liberalization.
JEL Classification Numbers: F31, F32, F47
Keywords: currency crises, the signals approach, early warning indicators, Croatia
*The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Croatian
National Bank or Zagreb Institute of Economics.
21. Introduction
The overall financial flows in the international financial markets have accelerated
enormously throughout 1990s, due to greater globalization, liberalization,
interconnectedness of those financial markets, and quick development of information
and telecommunications technologies. A rapid globalization process has put
increasing limitations on national economic policies, especially in small open
countries such as Croatia.
The Republic of Croatia embarked on a process of transition from a very liberal
socialistic economic system (so-called market socialism) towards a free market
economy as soon as it declared independence in 1991. The process of transition,
prolonged by a Serbo-Yugoslav aggression and war for independence, reached the
trough around 1995, and has been accelerating since 2001. In that context, the EU
recognized Croatian efforts in pursuing market reforms and finalized the talks on the
Stability and Accession Agreement (SAA) with Croatia in 2001. Under the SAA,
Croatia has to liberalize its capital account in the course of four years following the
ratification of the SAA by the two parties to the agreement. The capital account
liberalisation, whereas globalization is already overwhelming, is likely to put more
pressure on the policymaking in Croatia in the coming years until it eventually enters
the EU  which represents the final goal on the road paved by the signing of the SAA.
The Croatian National Bank (CNB) gained its monetary independence by the end of
1991 without any international reserves (because they had been held by the National
Bank of Yugoslavia before 1991, and were not transferred to the CNB afterwards).
The financial system was underdeveloped at the beginning of 1990s  it comprised
some 20 commercial banks and a few insurance companies, which had operated for
20-30 years under socialism. Banks inherited unindexed loan portfolios to the real
sector, which had over time become bad loans and lost their real value. The old banks
were re-capitalized through government bonds (so called big bonds), and new banks
began to emerge due to very liberal census requirements.
On October 4th, 1993 the government of Croatia launched a successful anti-
inflationary program. The aim of the program was to reduce inflation with the help of
heterodox measures, using three nominal anchors: the exchange rate to the German
mark, gross wages and salaries in the government sector and the central bank discount
rate.1 The program almost immediately brought a halt to price rises, even causing
deflation in the last two months of 1993, while it curbed inflation in 1994 to just 3.7%
annually - among the lowest rates in transition countries. Croatia managed to keep
inflation in the range of 3-5% in subsequent years. The overview of the Croatian
macroeconomic indicators for 1991-2000 can be found in Table 1 in the Appendix.
The exchange rate was allowed to float, and CNB introduced a new procedure of
determining its official exchange rate: as an average of the exchange rates used in
interbank trade among commercial banks for two previous days, thus reflecting
market moves.
                                                
1 Anuić, Rohatinski and onje (1995).
3Thanks to a halt of hyperinflation and internal convertibility, as well as a restrictive
monetary policy in 19942, the exchange rate was also kept stable (it appreciated 5-7%
by 1996). The CNB did not intervene much to keep it stable, since Croatia had no
access to the international financial markets until 1995/96. That was because it had
not yet solved the issue of its share of the ex-Yugoslav debt by then.
Reconstruction began in 1995, led by government programs financed abroad  since
credit rates in Croatia were at that point 10-15 percentage points higher than in
Europe. Fiscal expansion soon resulted in accelerated growth of the external debt.
Increased public expenditure was accompanied by rising personal consumption. All
those developments resulted in the current account deficit (reaching as high as 11% of
the GDP), as well as accumulation of foreign debt and appreciation pressures on the
currency (the inflow part of the debt cycle).
Consumption was helped by banks, which started to extend more consumer and
industrial loans. Some of the small and medium-sized banks offered double-digit
interest rates on deposits in order to attract funds from households and give them
away in the form of credits  and domestic credits grew 20% in 1997 and 1998. Since
the CNB bank supervision was not formed until 1995, it was still in the process of
training in 1997 and 1998 and was inexperienced and unable to cope with such a huge
rise of credit activity or vulnerability of the banking sector. The end of 1998 saw
some signs of the economic slowdown and credit defaults, while 10 fastest-growing
small and medium-sized banks collapsed. Their vulnerability was emphasized through
connected enterprises (group structure) that went bankrupt at the same time. As a
result, bankruptcies were instigated at 16 small and medium-sized banks and led to
their liquidation, which reduced the number of banks to 45 by the end of 2000.
The banking crisis erroded public trust in the banking sector and also eroded newly
gained confidence in the local currency. The kuna depreciated almost 10% against the
German mark at the beginning of 1999. Its depreciation was helped by the fact that
the grace period for rescheduled Paris and London club3 debts expired, and the annual
foreign debt service quota rose to more than 1 billion US dollars. From 1999,
scheduled debt repayments stood at between 1 and 2 billion US dollars, causing
pressure toward currency depreciation (the outflow part of the debt cycle). The
depreciation was halted, however, through the CNB foreign exchange interventions.
Since confidence in the banking sector was restored (thanks also to a sale of the
biggest banks to foreign strategic partners that increased foreign ownership to close to
90% of banking assets), deposits started flowing back into banks in 2000. The CNB
launched a process of financial liberalization by cutting the mandatory reserve ratio
for banks from 40% toward 15% in stages. Also at the beginning of 2001, it revised
foreign exchange regulations allowing enterprises to operate their foreign exchange
balances freely. The impact of the monetary relaxation on kuna liquidity helped bring
domestic money market rates down to below European levels in mid-2001, and banks
began to build up their foreign currency position. Amplified by first forward deals
between banks and enterprises and speculative moves by some banks, these
developments led to a sharp depreciation of the kuna by 5% to the German mark. The
                                                
2 Babić (1998).
3 Paris club loans were rescheduled in 1995, and London club loans in 1996.
4situation was brought under control by the most intense foreign exchange intervention
of The Croatian National Bank since its independence.
The liberalization of some capital account transactions in 2001 brought about high
volatility of the exchange rate, and heightened both the foreign exchange market and
exchange rate vulnerability. Croatia still has to open its primary and secondary long-
term securities and money markets to foreign (European) investors as part of the SAA
obligations in the coming years. It means that the volatility of the exchange rate and
the vulnerability of the kuna are poised to increase further. Therefore, in this paper we
will try to develop a system of signalling indicators of currency crises for Croatia. We
will be following the existent literature on the signal approach to predicting currency
disturbances and implementing it with respect to Croatia. The application of the
signals approach in transition countries is rare, to our knowledge, and this also will
be a first attempt to implement signal approach to Croatia for 1995-2001 period.
2. Background
Revival of the interest in the literature on financial crises came in the 1990s as costly
financial crises struck both developed and developing countries4. A number of studies
theoretically and empirically found various causes of crises and thus enabled
classifying the crisis episodes into three categories.5
The first generation models tried to explain currency and debt crisis episodes of the
Latin-American developing countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The basic
premise in those traditional models is the inconsistency with which the fundamental
macroeconomic variable (loose monetary policy, monetization of fiscal deficit)
expanded under the fixed exchange rate regime. The roots of these models can be
found in Salant and Henderson (1978), who tried to model speculative attacks on the
gold market. Krugman (1979) extends the Salant-Henderson model of speculative
attack onto the fixed exchange rates. In his seminal paper, Krugman assumes that a
rising fiscal deficit, financed by monetary expansion, leads to speculative attacks
making devaluation inevitable  and the timing of the devaluation can be calculated
exactly. Although Krugmans model was later revised and re-appraised, it represents
the basis of the first generation models.6
Foreign exchange market developments and expectations are put forward in the
second generation models (speculative models)7. The basic premise of those models is
that currency crises can occur even when macroeconomic fundamentals are
                                                
4 Chronologically, there was the ERM crisis, Mexican tequila crisis, Asian flu crisis, Russian
crisis, Brazilian crisis, Turkish crisis, and Argentinean crisis (2001), to name the most prominent.
5 For a review of the literature see Blejer (1998), Flood and Marion (1998), and Jeanne (2000).
6 Flood i Garber (1984) construct a linear simplification of Krugmans model within a stochastic
framework, and Blanco and Garber (1986) extend it to a structural model for analyzing and predicting
the exact timing of a devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1973-1982. The model showed that credit
growth and main monetary aggregates are significant variables in determining the probability of the
crisis. That model was extended by Goldberg (1993), and Cumby and Wijnbergen (1989) who showed
that credit growth was a main cause of the speculative attacks in Argentina in early 1980s. Dornbusch
(1987) re-appraises the differences between Krugmans deterministic and Flood-Garber stohastic
model in the case of Argentina.
7 Ozkan and Sutherland (1995); Obstfeld (1984, 1986, 1994, 1996); Gerlach and Smets (1994).
5consistent, driven by self-fulfilling speculative attacks (Obstfeld 1984, 1986, 1994,
1996). A crisis occurs when expectations of the foreign exchange market participants
are coherently turned in one direction. That cohereing factor - the trigger - can be
anything from a political event, release of some data to a change of economic policy.8
The very mechanism of coherence diffusion is also modelled as "rational" herd
behavior of the foreign exchange market participants and foreign investors.
International triggers are modelled through the contagion effects9.
The development of the third generation models of currency and financial crises
intensified after the Asian crisis (1997/98). These models combine currency crises
with the financial sector disturbances and weakneses, emphasising the effects of
financial sector liberalization, weak supervision and regulation, as well as bad risk
management and moral hazard of the financial institutions.10 Most of the third
generation models11 emphasise the overlending by the financial institutions with
implicit or explicit government guarantees, the creation of a speculative bubble and
burst of the bubble when unfavourable fundamental developments cause the value of
loans to exceed the guaranteed amount. One of the key factors related to financial and
currency crises is the fact that financial institutions draw funds from abroad in order
to start the overlending process. These models led to a development of the twin crisis
concept.12
Based on above mentioned theoretical literature, various studies tried to explain the
crises by using different empirical models in order to identify significant variables or
even leading indicators. Within the existing empirical literature, we can separate two
key approaches: the traditional approach and the most recent signaling
(nonparametric) approach. The first approach generally tries to use econometric
modelling13. Those studies that provide qualitative description of pre-crisis events14
                                                
8 Some of the models do explore the self-fulfilling speculative attacks as a multiple equilibria
phenomenon, which does not necessary have to end in a currency crisis - that outcome only arises
when the economic agents stop believing in the government policies (Obstfeld, 1994).
9 Allen and Gale (2000); Baig and Goldfajn (1998); Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000);
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplozs (1996); Gerlach and Smets (1994); Kruger, Osakwe, and Page (1998);
Masson (1998).
10 The initial attempt to connect financial sector weaknesses and the currency crises can be found in
Diaz-Alejandro (1985).
11 Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998b); Demirguc-Knut and Detragiache (1998); Dooley (2000);
Eichengreen and Rose (1998); Glick and Hutchison (2000); Gruben and McComb (1997); Irwin and
Vines (1999); Kaminsky (1998); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Krugman (1998, 1999); McKinnon
and Phill (1996).
12 Pioneering empirical work on the twin crises was done by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). An earlier
version of that research was published in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). Theoretical models of the
connection of the currency and banking crises can be found in: Diaz-Alejandro (1985); Velasco (1987);
Calvo (1995); Goldfajn and Valdes (1995); Miller (1998); and Chang and Velasco (1998).
13 Regression and more classical econometric modelling can be found in: Frankel and Rose (1996),
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Cumby and Wijnbergen
(1989), Ötker and Pazarbasioglu (1994, 1995), Edin and Vredin (1993), Edwards (1989), Klein and
Marion (1994), Kruger, Osakwe and Page (1998), Razin and Milesi-Ferritti (1997), Caramazza, Ricci
and Salgado (2000), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a), and Eichengreen and Rose (1998).
Probit/logit models were developed under the methodological influence of Blanco and Garber (1986),
who used these methods in analyzing the Mexican crisis of the early 1980s.
14 See Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), Kamin (1988), Edwards (1989), Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000), Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000).
6can also be considered traditional. The traditional approach has an advantage in its
simple interpretation. All information about a future crisis is contained in a single
number. However, it seems that this advantage also represents a disadvantage of the
method. This approach does not allow the researcher to rate indicators according to
their relative predictive power. Either the variables are significant or they are not, and
if they occasionally send incorrect signals, the methodology cannot detect this. This
methodology can hardly be expected to tell what went wrong in the global
economic activity or how to reformulate the economic policy to avoid a crisis.
The “signals” approach as a non-parametric method attempts to overcome the
difficulties and limitations faced by the traditional method in building a specific early
warning system for crises. The starting point is that disturbances that may lead to a
crisis do not happen accidentally, but are rather a result of the gradual deterioration in
economic conditions. This approach begins with a detailed analysis of the behavior of
variables whose movements in the pre-crisis period differ substantially from their
usual behavior in normal economic conditions. The signals approach was
established by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) as an alternative method to
facilitate deeper understanding of the behaviour of macroeconomic forces that pushed
the country into the crisis. The idea of developing a system of economic indicators
that can anticipate crises derives from the literature on business cycles and the
methods used to forecast business cycle turning points.15
The implementation of the signals approach started only in the late 1990s, and
could be very useful for multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF and World
Bank (for monitoring purposes), as well as for the investment community. In the
future, one can expect a more detailed empirical testing of the methods usefulness for
analytical and forecasting purposes.16
Why do we use the signals approach to identify a system of early warning
indicators for currency crises in Croatia? Our motives for using it in determining the
vulnerability of the Croatian foreign exchange market are as follows:
! The signals approach is a new analytical and forecasting method, and its
improvement and increasing usage is expected;
! Croatia already has a similar nonparametric method in use for analysing the
cyclical behaviour of the Croatian economy;17
! Perhaps the most important feature of this method is that it is applicable even in
the situations where there are data problems (short series of reliable data,
structural changes in the economy, frequent changes in the data methodology, a
small number of crisis episodes), that are also evident in Croatia.
A more detailed description of how the signals approach functions is given in the
following section, which shows an empirical test of the effectiveness of the method in
                                                
15 This refers to a well-known barometric method that is used to monitor and forecast economic
activity. In Croatia, the so-called CROLEI (CROatian Leading Economic Indicators) system has been
developed since 1994 to monitor and forecast the overall economic activity (Ahec-onje, 2000).
16 Thus, it is not strange that several studies examining the possibilities of using this method to analyze
currency or banking crises have already appeared. See, for example, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart
(1997), Kaminsky (1998), Bruggemann and Linne (1999), Edison (2000), Goldstein, Kaminsky and
Reinhart (2000), Nierhaus (2000), Glick and Hutchison (2000).
17 Kindleberger (1996) warned long ago that financial crises could be associated with certain phases in
the business cycle.
7predicting currency disturbances in Croatia. The ultimate goal of the exercise is to
build an effective early warning system for currency crisis in Croatia.
3. The early warning indicators for Croatia
3.1. Defining crises and choices of potential indicators
Currency crises are defined as situations in which speculative attacks on the currency
lead to a substantial depreciation, a substantial decrease in international reserves or a
combination of one and the other. This approach rests on a broad definition that
includes both successful and unsuccessful attacks on various exchange rate regimes.
Currency crises are usually identified (ex-post) by the behaviour of an index of
foreign exchange market pressure (FEMPI).18 Because of the indexs relative novelty,
there is no consensus about a standard way of its calculation. It is usually calculated
as a simple mean but more and more often as a weighted average, with standard
deviations of the exchange rate and international reserves (because of different
volatility of the exchange rate and international reserves) as weights. In a period of
higher sensitivity and volatility in the foreign exchange market, the index usually
exceeds two and even three standard deviations (or describes 33 % or 1% of extreme
behavior).19
The exchange market pressure index in Croatia is constructed by using the rates of
change in the international reserves and the real bilateral exchange rate of the national
currency against the euro.20
FEMPI*t = ∆ et - stdE/stdR*∆ Rt
where ∆ et is the real bilateral HRK/EUR exchange rate, ∆ Rt gross international
reserves, and stdE/stdR the ratio of standard deviations of the real exchange rate and
international reserves. We do not include interest rate in the calculation because
Croatia experienced periods of financial market deregulation, and because interest
rates were never considered as a potent instrument of monetary policy.
The index is costructed in such a way that a depreciation of national currency and
decreased international reserves work in the same direction, making the index grow
and expressing stronger downward pressure on the currency. If we exclude 1994, as a
year where some of the effects of a successful anti-inflation program were still present
in the economy, the index reveals two currency disturbances in the 1995-2001 period
(Figure 1).
                                                
18 The index itself originates in the 1970s monetary approach to the balance of payments and exchange
rate. By the end of 1970s, Girton and Roper (1977) formulated a monetary approach equation aimed at
working regardless of the exchange rate regime. The idea of measuring the foreign exchange market
pressure has been revived by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and later by Kaminsky, Lizondo
and Reinhart (1997).
19 That is why Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) pronounce periods with FEMPI exceeding +/- 3
standard deviations as turbulent, while Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplozs (1995) look for +/- 2
standard deviations violation.
20 Real bilateral exchange rate equals eHRK/EUR,t = EHRK/EUR,t * pEUR,t / pt, where pEUR,t and pt are HICP
inflation in the eurozone, and CPI inflation in Croatia, respectively.
8Figure 1
Source: calculations of the authors
Currency disturbances in Croatia
Jan/Feb 1999
real exchange rate depreciated 3.3%
 reserves shrank 15%
August 2001
real exchange rate depreciated 5,9%
 reserves shrank 1,8%
We will try to build a system of signal indicators based on those two turbulent
episodes. The choice of indicators whose behaviour in the pre-crisis period is to be
tested is based on theory and on the availability of monthly data. The list of potential
indicators of currency crises in Croatia is based on the Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart
list of 105 indicators, used by most studies on the signal approach as a starting point21.
Based on the early warning indicators literature, the most important indicators that
have been found to provide signals about upcoming currency crises are: international
reserves, the real exchange rate, credit growth, inflation, fiscal deficit, real GDP
growth, credit to the public sector, M2/international reserves. The following table
shows the total of 28 potential economic and financial indicators of currency
disturbances in Croatia, with their expected signs in a pre-crisis period22 (a description
of data is shown in Appendix).
                                                
21 The Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart list was compiled by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997)
after reviewing the existing empirical literature. The authors found that as many as 43 indicators from
the list were found significant in at least one of the reviewed 28 studies. Hawkins and Klau (2000)
reviewed 30 more studies published since 1997, and conclude that most of the recent empirical studies
base their research on the KLR list of indicators.
22 Although foreign total and short-term debt shoud have been included, the figures were not available
on a mothly basis before 2000 and there were significant methodological changes in 1999, making the
data before and after 1998 not comparable.
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9Table 2. Indicators of currency disturbances in Croatia
INDICATORS expected
sign in pre-
crisis period
The real effective exchange rate; The real bilateral HRK/EUR exchange rate;
International reserves, total; Net usable international reserves (NUIR);
NUIR/broad money (M4); CNB foreign assets/M4; Bank deposits; Banks
reserves with CNB/total bank assets; Industrial production; Exports; Trade
balance; Current account balance; Capital inflow
negative
M4 multiplier; M1 multiplier;  Money supply (M1); Base money (M0);
Domestic credit/output; Domestic credit,  Ratio of bank claims to the public
sector to total bank claims; Monetary institutions claims to public sector (net);
CNB claims on banks; Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions; Imports;
Budget deficit as a share of GDP; Budget deficit less capital revenues as a share
of GDP; Real money market interest rate; Lending/deposit interest rates ratio
positive
A brief summary of the stylized facts about their behaviour before and during the
crisis is given below.
! In pre-crisis periods, the domestic currency is either heavily overvalued or else exposed to
a strong pressure to appreciate. Therefore, real effective and real bilateral HRK/EUR
exchange rates usually bear negative signs.
! We can also expect to see a reduction of international reserves (gross and net) due to
moves to defend the proclaimed exchange rate parity. The ratio of net usable reserves
to M4 and the ratio of net foreign assets of the CNB to M4 are considered a good
indicator of currency crises. Depositors, especially in developing and emerging markets,
will take shelter in the currency they consider a safe haven for keping their financial
wealth as the government economic policies lose their credibility.
! In the case of M2 and M1 multipliers, we may expect a positive sign. An increase in the
multiplier with an unchanged monetary base signals an expansionary monetary policy and
likely pressure, leading to a deterioration of the domestic currency.
! The growth of M1 and M0 also means that the monetary policy is expansionary, causing
pressure for the domestic currency to deteriorate, so we expect a positive sign.
! Credit expansion is considered a strong signal of currency and banking disturbances to
come. It usually accompanies the phases of the business cycle and domestic financial
liberalization. So the ratio of credits to output23 and growth of the bank credits to
domestic sectors are related positively to currency (and banking) disturbances.
! Out of the models of the twin crisis, we included the following indicators of banking
sector vulnerability24, which can also provoke currency disturbances: total bank deposits
(expected to fall before/during the banking crisis, due to a run on banks), the ratio of
bank reserves with the CNB to total bank assets (expected to fall because of the
increase of bank assets  i.e. the credit boom), the ratio of bank claims on the public
sector to total claims, and the ratio of net claims of monetary instuitutions on the
central government (expected to grow in the pre-crisis period due to a monetization of
the public deficit), CNB credits to banks (these grow as their liquidity shrinks), and
foreign liabilities of the monetary institutions (increasing their external vulnerability).
! Industrial output (the base index of industrial ouput, 1995=100) and exports have
negative expected signs in pre-crisis episodes (weak output and exports either weaken the
exchange rate, or an overvalued exchange rate slows down exports and output).
                                                
23 A ratio of bank credits to the domestic sector and the base industrial output index (1995=100).
24 We include it because of the 1998 banking crisis, which brought about a currency disturbance at the
beginning of 1999.
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! We excpect to see an import increase in the pre-crisis period (helped by an overvalued
currency), which also worsens the balance of trade and current account balance
(expected negative signs).
! A widening of the budget deficit usually causes monetary expansion, hence the currency
crisis (as established in the first generation models).
! Interest rates are usually very weak indicators of the currency crises, while being better
indicators of the banking crises. An increase of nominal (and real) interest rates could
mean shrinking liquidity in the financial system, while high loan to deposit rate ratio can
signal a risk increase and deterioration of the bank portfolio, as well as lack of
competition and supervisory and regulatory weaknesses.
! Reduced capital inflows can be a sign of international financial markets disturbances, as
well as of distrust in the local governments economic policy. This indicator can signal
so-called spill-over effects within regions, as in 1998, when a currency crisis in one
Asian country affected another, drying out capital inflows in the whole region. We have
not included this indicator, however, because it is only available on a quarterly basis.
3.2. The signal horizon, signals and critical values (thresholds)
The signal horizon is the period before a crisis during which the behavior of the
indicators signals the upcoming crisis. We chose a horizon of 12 months before each
disturbance.
The signal horizon
Jan/Feb 1999
August 2001
12 months (2/98 until 1/99)
12 months (9/00 until 8/01)
A signal emitted within 12 months prior to the outbreak of currency disturbances
(crisis) constitutes a good signal. A signal emitted before that date is correspondingly
a bad or false signal. An indicator provides a warning signal within a 12-month
window if it exceeds a critical value (threshold). The critical values are set to achieve
a certain balance between the risk of having false signals (noise) and the risk of
ignoring good signals of a crisis that is in fact impending. However, there are no
general rules for determining the critical value. If the threshold is set very high, the
indicator is likely to ignore all but the most severe crises. If the critical value is set
very low, there is a risk of catching a number of false warning signals in tranquil
times. We set the critical values k* in relation to percentiles of the distribution of
observations of the indicator It, in order to discriminate between normal and
abnormal behavior of an individual indicator. In most cases we used 25% percentile
of the distribution (if the indicator falls prior to currency disturbances) or 75%
percentile of the distribution (if the indicator rises prior to crisis).25
After determining the tresholds, we determine the total number of good and false
signals in crisis and tranquil times:
                                                
25 The treshold has been lowered to the 33,3%-th or the 66,67%-th percentile in individual cases, when
previous analysis showed the quartils to be too high tresholds. For example, high interest rates in the
first half of 1990s reflected existing structural problems in the banking sector and economy, as well as
the lack of competition and a weak regulatory framework. As the situation in the financial sector
improved, the interest rates started to decline.
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a) for indicators with positive expected signs in pre-crisis period it holds:
St = 1, if It > k, i St = 0, if It ≤ k
b) for indicators with negative expected signs in pre-crisis period it holds:
St = 1, if It < k, i St = 0, if It ≥ k
St is a binary signal variable, constructed by virtue of the principle set above. An
indicator sends a good signal if St = 1 and a crisis occurs within the signal horizon or
St = 0 and no crisis occurs within a tranquil period. On the contrary, an indicator
issues a false signal if St = 1 and no crisis breaks out within a tranquil period or St = 0
and a crisis breaks out within the signal horizon.
3.3. Performance of Individual Indicators
The most important criterion for assessing the effectiveness of indicators is the
confirmation of their reliability in signalling a future crisis. The performance of each
indicator can be estimated in terms of the following matrix (Table 3):
Table 3. Matrix for estimating individual currency crisis indicators
CRISIS
within signal
horizon
NO CRISIS
within signal
horizon
TOTAL
signal was sent (St = 1) A B A+B
no signal was sent (St = 0) C D C+D
Total A+C B+D A+B+C+D
good signals A D A+D
good as % of total A/(A+C) D/(B+D) (A+D)/(A+B+C+D)
false as  % of total C/(A+C) B/(B+D) (B+C)/(A+B+C+D)
Source: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), Nierhaus (2000).
In the above matrix, A is the number of months in which the indicator issued good
signals of an upcoming crisis, B is the number of months with bad signals (noise), C
is the number of months without a signal but that were followed by a crisis, and D is
the number of months without a signal and no subsequent crisis. An ideal indicator is
one that produces a signal in every month within the signal horizon, so that A>0 and
C=0, or one which does not produce any signals in time horizon that is not to be
followed by a crisis, so that D<0 and B=0. Based on this matrix and following the
method of KLR26, it is possible to calculate measures that can help rank the indicators
according to their predictive power. Information on the performance of 28 individual
indicators of currency disturbances in Croatia is presented in Table 4.
                                                
26 See Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1997).
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Table 4. Performance of Individual Indicators for currency disturbances - Croatia
% good
signals
% false
signals
noise-to-
signal
ratio
"lead time" P
crisis/sig
nal
P crisis/signal 
P crisisINDICATORS
A/(A+C) B/(B+D) B/(B+D)
A/(A+C)
before I i II
disturbance
A/(A+B) A/(A+B) 
A+C/(A+B+C+D)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. The real effective exchange rate
2. The real bilateral HRK/EUR exchange rate
3. International reserves
4. Net usable reserves (NUIR)
5. NUIR / M4
6. CNB foreign assets /  M4
7. M4 multiplier
8. M1 multiplier
9. Growth of M1
10. Growth of base money (M0)
11. Domestic credits / output
12. Domestic credit
13. Bank deposits
14. Bank reserves with CNB / bank assets
15. Ratio of bank claims on the public sector to
total bank claims
16. Net claims of monetary institutions on
public sector
17. CNB credits to banks
18. Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions
0,43
0,58
0,21
0,33
0,54
0,50
0,29
0,38
0,25
0,13
0,46
0,46
0,25
0,42
0,29
0,25
0,46
0,38
0,09
0,07
0,41
0,33
0,25
0,14
0,23
0,18
0,25
0,32
0,27
0,27
0,39
0,16
0,23
0,24
0,14
0,18
0,21
0,12
1,95
1,00
0,46
0,28
0,79
0,47
1,00
2,46
0,59
0,59
1,56
0,38
0,79
0,96
0,30
0,47
13(I )
13(I) 14(II)
11 (I)
8 (I)
10(I) i 9(II)
17(I)
3(I) i 1(II)
14(II)
9(II)
5(II)
18(I)
19(I) i 1(II)
6(I)
19(I) i 8(II)
12(II)
8(II)
11(I) i 1(II)
11(I) i 1(II)
0,77
0,82
0,22
0,35
0,48
0,60
0,41
0,53
0,35
0,18
0,48
0,48
0,26
0,59
0,41
0,35
0,65
0,53
0,35
0,47
-0,13
0,00
0,18
0,30
0,06
0,18
0,00
-0,17
0,13
0,13
-0,09
0,24
0,06
0,00
0,30
0,18
19. Industrial output growth
20. Exports
21. Imports
22. Trade balance
23. Budget deficit / GDP
24. Budget deficit less capital revenues / GDP
25. Real money market interest rate
26. Ratio of  lending to deposit interest rate
27. Current account balance, quarterly
28. Capital inflows, quarterly
0,33
0,04
0,21
0,25
0,29
0,29
0,38
0,08
0,50
0,38
0,20
0,36
0,27
0,25
0,22
0,22
0,32
0,52
0,28
0,23
0,61
9,00
1,29
1,00
0,76
0,76
0,84
6,50
0,56
0,61
4(I)
-
8(II)
9(II)
2(I) i 11(II)
2(I) i 11(II)
9(I)
1(I)
5k(I) i 1k(II)
4k(I)
0,47
0,06
0,29
0,35
0,50
0,50
0,39
0,08
0,44
0,38
0,12
-0,29
-0,06
0,00
0,07
0,07
0,04
-0,27
0,13
0,27
Source: Calculations of the authors
For each indicator, the first column of Table 4 shows the number of good signals as a
percentage of the number of months in which good signals could have been emitted.
The maximum score (100%) would belong to an indicator that sent signals every
month within the signal horizon before every observed crisis. According to this
criterion, the best signal indicator is the real bilateral HRK/EUR exchange rate with
58% of good signals in the turbulent period, while exports have the smallest share of
good signals (4%).
The second column of Table 4 shows the number of false signals as a percentage of
the number of months in which false signals could have been. Obviously, the lower
the number in the second column, the better the indicator. According to this criterion,
the real bilateral exchange rate (HRK/EUR) shows the best performance (issuing only
7% of false signals in tranquil times), while the lending rate/deposit rate ratio shows
the poorest performance (issuing 52% of possible false signals).
The key measure calculated on the basis of the matrix is the adjusted noise-to-signal
ratio (the third column of Table 4). The ratio provides information on the ability of
the indicator to produce correct signals and to avoid false signals. The lower this ratio
comes in for an indicator, the more successful is the indicator in predicting currency
disturbances. If an indicator issues signals at random times, the expected value of the
ratio is equal to unity. Therefore, all those variables with noise-to-signal ratio equal to
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or higher than unity should be removed from the analysis. The third column of Table
4 shows which indicators had the best (lowest) noise-to-signal ratio: the real bilateral
exchange rate (0,12), followed by the real effective exchange rate (0,21), the ratio of
CNB foreign assets to broad money (0,28), CNB credits to domestic money banks
(0,30), M1 multiplier (0,47).27
The choice of the best performing indicators should also depend on the lead-time of
the indicator. It is necessary to establish how many months before the crisis a
particular indicator produces its first warning signal. Usually, an average lead-time is
calculated for all events of the crisis. However, since we here analyze only two
identified turbulent events, we will analyze each of them separately. Out of all
potential indicators, only six of them signalled both disturbances, with the rest
signalling only one of them. The fourth column of the table above shows that, in case
of the first currency disturbance, the longest lead-time of 19 months belongs to total
credits to domestic sector, and to the ratio of banks reserves held at the CNB to total
bank assets. The August 2001 disturbance was detected earliest by the real bilateral
exchange rate (14 months) and by M1 multiplier (14 months). The lead time of the
indicators reveals the difference between the two disturbances. The first currency
disturbance at the beginning of 1999 occurred at the peak of a banking crisis, and
during a period of recession for the national economy. The macroeconomic situation
and financial system soundness was very different in August 2001. That is why a
number of indicators that detected the first disturbance are in fact traditional
indicators of bank disturbances. If the first currency disturbance had grown into a full-
blown crisis (with a strong loss of reserves, currency depreciation by more than 20%),
then we could have spoken of twin crises. Indicators that anticipated the August 2001
disturbance are for the most part traditional currency crisis indicators.
The last measure of noisiness of the indicators is a comparison between the
probability of a crisis conditional on a signal from the indicator and the unconditional
probability of a crisis. For those indicators that have predictive power, the
conditional probability would be higher than the unconditional one (the fifth and the
sixth column of Table 4). From these estimates it is obvious that the indicators whose
conditional probability of a crisis is higher than the unconditional one, are the same
ones whose adjusted noise-to-signal ratio is lower than unity. The real bilateral
exchange rate shows the highest score, with an estimated conditional probability of a
currency disturbance of 82%, followed by CNB credits to local banks (65%) and CNB
foreign assets/broad money (60%).
The results of the signals approach used in this in-sample analysis serve as a basis
for designing an early warning system for currency disturbances in Croatia (Table 5).
The early warning system should consist of the indicators which detect the
disturbance very early, and emit a persistent signal within the signal horizon.
                                                
27 We have to mention that capital inflows and current account balance proved to be good signal
indicators, according to the above mentioned criteria. But since they are only available on a quarterly
basis, they are left out of the early warning system.
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Table 5. The set of early warning indicators for currency disturbances - Croatia
INDICATORS noise to signal
ratio
1. The real bilateral HRK/EUR exchange rate
2. CNB credits to banks
3. Bank reserves with CNB / bank assets
4. NIUR/M4
5. M1 multiplier
6. Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions
7. Domestic credit
8. Budget deficit / GDP
9. Ratio of bank claims to public sector to total bank claims
0,12
0,30
0,38
0,46
0,47
0,47
0,59
0,76
0,79
While choosing the indicators, we tried to pick those that either detect both
disturbances or only the August 2001 disturbance. Figures in the Appendix represent
the behaviour of nine early warning indicators for currency disturbances in Croatia.
3.4. The Composite Indicators of Currency Disturbances
In this section we will discuss two ways of combining the information provided by the
set of early warning indicators in order to produce useful indices of vulnerability of
the foreign exchange market. The idea is to construct the composite indicator of
currency disturbances by weighting the signals of each individual indicator.
The first approach gives equal weights to all nine individual indicators from the early
warning system:
SIt = ∑r=1,..,9 Sr,t /9
where binary variable Sr,t is equal to unity if the indicator (Ir,t) crosses the critical
value k* in period t and zero otherwise. The next figure shows the performance of
unweighted composite currency disturbances indicator.
Figure 2. Composite Currency Disturbances Indicator for Croatia (unweighted)
Source: calculations of the authors
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The composite indicator SIt can assume values between zero and unity (SIt ∈ [0,1]).
When each individual indicator (Ir,t) issues a signal of upcoming disturbances in
period t, the composite indicator value is equal to unity (SIt=1) and vice versa.
Furthermore, the composite indicator issues a crisis warning signal if the critical value
k* is exceeded. In order to set a critical value (treshold) for the composite indicator
we used the 75% percentile of the distribution. This means that the composite
indicator issues a warning signal if it exceeds k*=0,33. Figure 2 shows clearly that SIt
signalled both disturbances on the Croatian foreign exchange market almost 12
months ahead.
The second approach combines the information on the forecasting accuracy of nine
signal indicators, which is better than not weighting them, because it puts better
performing indicators forward. The composite early warning indicator SIt* is obtained
by weighting the signals of individual signal indicators by an inverse of their noise-to-
signal ratio.
SIt* = ∑r=1,..,9 Sr,t ωr
where ωr=[(1/δr)/∑r=1,..,91/δr], and δr is the noise-to-signal ratio of each individual
indicator (r=1,..,9). As a result, the composite indicator SIt* gives more weight to the
indicators that have a lower noise-to-signal ratios. The next table shows the weigthing
scheme for the composite indicator SIt*.
Table 6. The weigthing scheme for the composite indicator SIt*
INDICATORS weights in %
ωr=[(1/δr)/∑r=1,..,91/δr]
1. The real bilateral HRK/EUR exchange rate
2. CNB credits to banks
3. Bank reserves with CNB/ bank assets
4. NIUR/M4
5. M1 multiplier
6. Foreign liabilities of the monetary institutions
7. Domestic credits
8. Budget deficit / GDP
9. Ratio of bank claims on the public sector to total bank
claims
33,3
13,3
10,5
8,7
8,5
8,5
6,8
5,3
5,1
       TOTAL 100,0
Source: calculation of the authors
The highest weight is given to the best performing individual indicator  the real
bilateral exchange rate. The next figure shows the behaviour of the weighted
composite indicator.
The composite indicator SI* anticipates a turbulence on the foreign exchange market
if it exceedes the critical value k*=0,41, which is determined by the 75% percentile of
the distrubution. Figure clearly shows that during the signal horizon SI* sent fewer
signals of the upcoming Jan/Feb 1999 disturbance than the unweighted indicator SI.
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Figure 3. Composite Currency Disturbances Indicator (weighted)
Source: calculations of the authors
In Table 7 we compare the forecasting accuracy and quality of both composite
indicators SI and SI*.
Table 7 Performance of the composite currency disturbance indicators
%good
signals
% false signals adjusted noise-
to-signal ratio
P(crisis/signal) P(crisis/signal)-
P(crisis)
A/(A+C) B/(B+D) B/(B+D)
A/(A+C)
A/(A+B) A/(A+B) 
A+C/(A+B+C+D)
SI (unweighed)
SI* (weighted)
58
58
5
7
0,09
0,12
0,88
0,82
0,53
0,47
Source: calculations of the authors
Obviously, both composite indicators anticipated the turbulent episodes in Croatia,
determined by the index of foreign ecxhange market pressure. In both cases the
adjusted noise-to-signal ratio are well below unity, as well as below the adjusted
noise-to signal ratio of the best individual indicator  the real bilateral exchange rate.
The composite indicator SI* has a slightly higher percentage of false signals in
tranquil times leading to its higher noise-to-signal ratio (0,12), compared to the
unweighted indicator SI (0,09). However, the estimated conditional probability of
currency disturbances of both indicators is higher than 80%, which confirms their
ability to anticipate the turbulances on the foreign exchange market.
4. Concluding remarks
The set of early warning indicators, that proved useful and accurate in forecasting
currency disturbances in Croatia, exceeded our expectations. Despite the fact that
Croatia did not experience a true currency crisis resulting in a major devaluation or
change in the exchange rate regime in the 1995-2001 period, the signals approach
helped us to identify indicators that anticipate episodes of mild turbulance in Croatia
in the period under observation. Also, it is quite encouraging that many of the
variables that proved to be reliable warning indicators of currency disturbances are
consistent with theoretical expectations and are supported by the empirical literature
focusing on the causes of currency crises. However, one should have in mind the fact
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that there were too few disturbances during that period to formulate a stable early
warning system.
The first currency disturbance happened at the beginning of 1999 after the peak of the
banking crisis (1998/99). The CNB eased the depreciation pressures through foreign
exchange interventions. Worsened liquidity of the banking and real sector limited the
banks ability to control their own liquidity, so they had no power to launch a
coordinated speculative attack. Furthermore, the fact that the sale of domestic
securities to foreigners was not yet liberalized and that the governement financed
itself largely in the international markets helped Croatia avoid a full-blown crisis. The
second currency disturbance in August of 2001 came only after the CNB started a
domestic financial liberalization by lowering the reserve ratio, and after it liberalized
the foreign exchange regulations by allowing businesses to manage their foreign
exchange balances starting from June 2001. Soon the yield on treasury and CNB bills
dropped below European benchmarks and banks started to switch their foreign
currency positions, building up foreign exchange assets. Those factors brought about
depreciationary pressures that the CNB managed to quash through foreign exchange
interventions with much more difficulty than ever before.
Apart from the real bilateral exchange rate, both disturbances were detected early
enough by: a ratio of net usable international reserves to total liquid assets (M4), a
ratio of bank reserves held at the CNB to total bank assets and the budget deficit. We
included in the system the following series that signalled the 1998/99 currency and
banking crisis, and came close to their tresholds before August 2001: CNB credits to
banks, foreign liabilities of the monetary institutions and the growth of credits to
domestic sectors. We completed the system by including the two variables that reflect
the impact of monetary and fiscal policy actions on the vulnerability of the foreign
exchange market: M1 multiplier and claims on the government. Composite indicators
reveal to us that the pressure on the domestic currency was higer in August 2001.
This paper represents the beginning of a serious empirical task whose final goal is to
build an effective and reliable early warning system for currency distrurbances in
Croatia. The first step has been made to use a very new method, so the group of
indicators analyzed here can be seen as a basis for further research. We saw that the
domestic financial and very modest capital account liberalization in Croatia in 2001
brought about turbulences on the countrys foreign exchange market, which were
overcome with serious difficulties. The Stabilization and Accession Agreement
Croatia signed with the EU obliges it to pursue further liberalization of its capital
account. The ultimate goal is to find the most efficient warning information that may
allow policymakers enough maneuvering space to avoid or at least minimize negative
consequences of any future currency crisis in Croatia.
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Appendix
Table 1. Croatian macroeconomic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
REAL SECTOR
GDP, constant (1990) prices,
mil. kuna
221,4 195,5 179,8 190,3 203,3 215,5 229,5 235,3 234,6 243,1
GDP, current prices, mil.
kuna
441,2 2706,6 39003,2 87441,2 98382,0 107980,6 123812,0 137604,0 142700,0 157511,0
Consumption, private, curr.
prices, mil. kuna
- - - 46574,9 60476,1 63299,4 77028,0 81067,0 81545,0 90025,0
Investment, current prices,
mil. kuna
- - - 15191,3 17313,5 23749,2 29936,0 32066,0 32956,0 33091,0
Government cons., current
prices, mil. kuna
- - - 25737,8 30455,7 30619,1 32183,0 36642,0 39637,0 41702,0
Exports, current prices, mil.
kuna
- - - 40086,3 40606,2 45016,6 50873,0 54547,0 57902,0 70892,0
Imports, current prices, mil.
kuna
- - - 40149,2 50469,5 55429,0 70351,0 67700,0 69731,0 79745,0
CPI base index (1995=100) 0,7 7,6 93,2 95,6 100,0 103,5 108,8 114,6 117,4 127,1
CPI chain index - 1019,6 1225,1 102,5 104,6 103,5 105,1 105,4 102,4 108,3
Average monthly net wage,
end of period, kuna
- 74,4 1073,2 1646,0 1883,0 2217,0 2544,0 2935,0 3262,0 3499,0
MONETARY SECTOR
Monetary base, mil. kuna - - 2248,9 4714,2 6744,1 8770,3 10346,1 9954,2 10310,0 11717,3
M1, millions of kuna - - 3134,4 6642,6 8234,9 11368,9 13731,4 13531,4 13858,9 18030,3
M4, millions of kuna - - 10061,1 17679,9 24623,0 36701,1 50742,0 57340,3 56698,6 73321,4
FC deposits, millions of kuna - - 5412,3 8783,3 14099,4 21817,5 31278,1 37970,9 36966,0 46901,6
Domestic credits, millions of
kuna
- - 39339,1 43280,5 47976,6 48464,9 56194,9 66923,1 65938,6 72080,3
Total assets of banking
sector, mil. kuna
- - 47332,4 54620,3 62653,6 67482,7 85309,3 93326,4 93251,5 109981,5
Number of banks - - 43 50 53 57 60 60 53 45
Daily money market rate - 2182,3 86,9 17,8 27,2 10,4 9,4 15,8 12,7 4,5
Average bank loan rate - 2332,9 59,0 12,4 22,3 18,5 14,1 16,1 13,5 10,5
Average bank deposit rate - 434,5 27,4 5,0 6,1 4,2 4,4 4,1 4,3 3,4
FISCAL SECTOR
Consolidated government
revenue, mil. kuna
- - - 36882,3 43283,1 48396,6 53345,3 65110,7 67541,0 66735,0
Consolidated govern.
expenditure, mil. kuna
- - - 35469,3 44166,1 48874,0 54931,9 64228,6 70343,0 74432,3
Consolidated government
balance, mil. kuna
- - - 1413,0 -883,0 -477,4 -1586,7 882,1 -2802,1 -7697,3
Internal government debt,
mil. kuna
- - 22865,2 18674,1 17741,2 17263,0 15538,4 15047,8 16754,6 21344,7
External government debt,
mil. kuna
- - 833,4 754,2 1279,6 13477,8 18314,9 21049,7 29962,5 38275,9
Total government debt, mil.
kuna
23698,6 19428,3 19020,8 30740,9 33853,3 36097,5 46717,1 59620,6
EXTERNAL SECTOR
Current account balance,
millions of dollars
- - 623,0 853,4 -1441,5 -1091,3 -2325,1 -1530,6 -1390,4 -354,7
International reserves CNB,
mil. dollars
- 166,8 616,2 1405,0 1895,2 2314,0 2539,0 2815,6 3025,0 3524,8
External debt, millions of
dollars
- - 2637,8 3019,8 3809,1 5307,6 7451,6 9588,2 9872,3 10840,1
NEER index (1995=100) 0,9 5,4 65,7 109,8 100,0 102,2 108,1 110,9 121,2 131,1
REER index (1995=100) 88,1 155,5 129,1 107,3 99,9 102,0 106,9 105,6 112,7 118,8
HRK/USD exchange rate,
period average
- 0,2643 3,5774 5,9961 5,2300 5,4338 6,1571 6,3623 7,1124 8,2753
HRK/DEM exchange rate,
period average
- 0,1710 2,1492 3,6920 3,6493 3,6141 3,5560 3,6193 3,8754 3,9038
Memo:
GDP, current prices, mil.
dollars
- 10241,0 10902,6 14583,0 18811,2 19872,0 20109,0 21628,0 20063,4 19033,8
Average monthly net wage,
end of period, USD
- 281,6 300,0 274,5 360,0 408,0 413,2 461,3 458,6 422,8
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Total government debt, mil.
dollars
- - 6624,5 3240,1 3636,9 5657,3 5498,3 5673,6 6568,4 7204,6
Private consumption/GDP - - - 53,3% 61,5% 58,6% 62,2% 58,9% 57,1% 57,2%
Investment/GDP - - - 17,4% 17,6% 22,0% 24,2% 23,3% 23,1% 21,0%
Government
consumption/GDP
- - - 29,4% 31,0% 28,4% 26,0% 26,6% 27,8% 26,5%
Consolidated
gov.consumption/GDP
- - - 40,6% 44,9% 45,3% 44,4% 46,7% 49,3% 47,3%
Openness (EX+IMP/GDP) - - - 91,8% 92,6% 93,0% 97,9% 88,8% 89,4% 95,6%
Financial development
(M4/GDP)
- - 25,8% 20,2% 25,0% 34,0% 41,0% 41,7% 39,7% 46,6%
Curr.account/GDP - - 5,7% 5,9% -7,7% -5,5% -11,6% -7,1% -6,9% -1,9%
Int.reserves/months of
imports
- - - 251,8% 235,7% 272,2% 266,7% 317,5% 370,3% 438,9%
Ext.debt/GDP - - 24,2% 20,7% 20,2% 26,7% 37,1% 44,3% 49,2% 57,0%
Ext.debt/Exports - - - 45,2% 49,1% 64,1% 90,2% 111,8% 121,3% 126,5%
Pub.ext.debt/Ext.debt - - 8,8% 4,2% 6,4% 46,7% 39,9% 34,5% 42,7% 42,7%
Source: Croatian national bank, Croatian Statistical Office
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Data Description
Sources:
Bulletin Croatian National Bank (CNB);
Monthly Statistical Report, Central Bureau of Statistics, Croatia;
Monthly Statistical Review, Ministry of Finance, Croatia.
The indicators are expressed as annual growth rates, with the exception of
exchange rates, interest rates, budget deficit as a share of GDP, the ratio of CNB
foreign assets to broad money, the ratio of net usable international reserves to
broad money, capital account balance and capital inflow.
1. The real effective exchange rate  is a weighted geometric average of the index of bilateral
exchange rates of the kuna against a basket of currencies (euro, US dollar, Swiss franc, British
pound and Slovenian tolar) corrected for the relevant relative price indices (the ratio of price
indices in partner countries and domestic prices), deflator is retail price index (CNB Table H10)
2. The real bilateral exchange rate HRK/EUR  is nominal bilateral exchange rate HRK/EUR
(midpoint exchange rate of the CNB, end of period) multiplied by HICP inflation in Euro-zone
and divided by CPI inflation in Croatia, (CNB Table H9)
3. International reserves, total, US$ (CNB Table H6)
4. Net usable international reserves (NUIR) in US$ - NUIR = international reserves  foreign
liabilities  f/c denominated CNB bills  reserve requirement in f/c (Source: CNB)
5. NUIR/broad money (M4)  broad money comprises money (M1), savings and time deposits,
foreign currency deposits as well as bonds and money market instruments (CNB Table B1)
6. CNB foreign assets/broad money (M4)  foreign assets of  CNB include monetary gold,
holdings of special drawing rights, foreign cash in vaults, reserve position in the IMF, current
account balances with foreign banks, time deposits with foreign banks, foreign currency security
investments and other claims (CNB Table C1)
7. M4 multiplier - M4/M0, M0 is base (reserve) money (CNB Table A1)
8. M1 multiplier  (M1/M0), (CNB Table A1)
9. Money supply (M1), (CNB Table A1)
10. Base money (M0), (CNB Table A1)
11. Domestic credit/output  the index of kuna and foreign currency loans granted by domestic
money banks to domestic sectors (1995=100); the measure for output is and index of industrial
production (1995=100), (CNB Table D5; CBS)
12. Domestic credit  kuna and foreign currency loans granted by DMBs to domestic sectors (CNB
Table D5)
13. Bank deposits  (calculated as broad money minus currency in circulation) (CNB Table A1, C1)
14. Ratio of DMBs reserves with CNB to total DMBs assets (CNB Table D1)
15. Ratio of DMBs claims on central government and funds (net) to total DMBs claims (CNB
Table D1)
16. Monetary institutions claims on central government and funds (net), (CNB Table B1)
17. CNB claims on DMBs (CNB Table C1)
18. Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions (CNB and DMBs), (CNB Tables C1 and D1)
19. Growth of industrial production  the index of total industrial production (1995=100), (CBS)
20. Export growth, (CBS)
21. Import growth  (CBS)
22. Trade balance  is defined as the logarithm of exports divided by imports (CBS)
23. Budget deficit as a share of GDP  monthly nominal GDP was interpolated from quarterly data
(CBS, Ministry of finance)
24. Budget deficit (less capital revenues) as a share of GDP, (CBS, Ministry of finance)
25. Real money market interest rate   nominal money market interest rate (in % on annual basis)
minus the annual rate of change of retail prices (CNB Table G1; CBS)
26. Lending/deposit interest rates ratio  nominal interest rates on kuna loans and deposits not
indexed to foreign exchange (CNB Table G1 and G2)
27. Current account balance in USD, quarterly (CNB, Table H1)
28. Capital inflow in USD, quarterly (CNB Table H5)
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System of 9 indicators performance
Figure1. Figure 2.
Figure 3 Figure 4.
Figure 5 Figure 6.
Figure 7 Figure 8.
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Figure 9
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